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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




ROTH, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 These eleven consolidated0 actions were brought by concerned Pennsylvanians who 
believed that they were being charged excessive fees and interest on their credit cards 
and that these charges violated Pennsylvania consumer protection laws.  None of the 
defendants are Pennsylvania lending institutions.  The cases were all brought in 
Pennsylvania state courts and then removed by the defendants to the federal system.
                     
0
 The eleven actions which are consolidated before us were filed as class action 
complaints, but the actions have not been certified as class actions.  Ament v. PNC Nat'l 
Bank, 849 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (W.D. Pa. 1994). 
0
 The individual cases are:  Spellman v. Meridian Bank (DE), No. 94-3203 (Meridian 
Bank is a Delaware chartered bank insured by the F.D.I.C. and its successor in interest, 
Mellon Bank, is a national bank located in Delaware; district court docket numbers 92
3860, 93-868); Goehl v. Mellon Bank (DE), No. 94-3204 (Mellon is a national bank located 
in Delaware; district court docket numbers 92-2547, 93-878); Ament v. PNC Nat'l Bank
94-3215 (PNC is a national bank located in Delaware; district court docket number 92
Caplan v. Mellon Bank (DE) N.A., No. 94-3215  (Mellon Bank is a national bank located in 
Delaware; district court docket number 92-302); Szydlik v. First Omni Bank, N.A., No. 94
3215 (First Omni is a national bank located in Delaware; district court docket number 92
330); Thompson v. Maryland Bank, No. 94-3215 (Maryland Bank is a national bank located in 
Delaware; district court docket number 92-346); Tompkins v. American Gen. Fin. Ctr.
94-3216 (American General is a Utah chartered bank insured by the F.D.I.C.; district court 
13 
 These cases require that we resolve the conflict between state consumer-
protection law and federal banking law. We will first consider the district courts' 
holdings that removal jurisdiction was proper, based on the doctrine of complete 
preemption.  We will reverse the district courts on this issue. The Supreme Court's 
conservative extension of the complete preemption doctrine and the application of the 
Third Circuit's two-pronged test establish that federal jurisdiction is lacking in those 
cases in which the plaintiffs did not amend their complaints to allege federal claims.   
 Certain plaintiffs also alleged federal causes of action against California 
lending institutions.0  Consequently, we will next consider claims particular to these 
actions, which the district court dismissed.  We conclude that the district court properly 
determined that the plaintiffs in two of the California-lender actions lacked standing.  
In the remaining action, however, we must consider whether the term "interest" in § 30 of 
the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1988), encompasses late charges and over-limit fees 
assessed to credit card holders. We will affirm the district court to the extent that the 
court held that plaintiffs' state law claims regarding late charges and over-limit fees 
were substantively preempted.  See Ament v. PNC Nat'l Bank, 849 F. Supp. 1015, 1018
(W.D. Pa. 1994).  We will reverse and remand, however, for further proceedings regarding 
the legality of these fees under California law. 
I. 
                                                                                          
docket number 92-375); Szydlik v. Associates Nat'l Bank, No. 94-3216 (Associates National 
is a national bank located in Delaware, but its predecessor in interest was located in 
California; district court docket number 92-1025); Deffner v. CoreStates Bank, No. 94
(this consolidated action involves both Corestates, which is a national bank located in 
Delaware, and Household Bank, which is a federal savings association located in California 
and chartered by the federal government under the Home Owners' Loan Act; district court 
docket numbers 92-349, 92-398); Bartlam v. Bank of Am., No. 94-3217 (Bank of America is a 
national bank located in California; district court docket number 92-1427); Tompkins v.
Chase Manhattan Bank (USA), No. 94-3218 (Chase is a Delaware chartered bank insured by the 
F.D.I.C.; district court docket number 92-714). 
0
 The three California lender cases are Szydlik v. Associates National Bank
94-3216, Bartlam v. Bank of America, No. 94-3217, and Deffner v. CoreStates Bank, No. 94
3217. 
14 
 Plaintiff cardholders allege that the defendant banks violated Pennsylvania law 
by charging certain fees in connection with their credit card programs.  Plaintiffs' 
accounts are governed by agreements that provide for one or more of the following charges:  
percentage-based finance charges on outstanding balances, annual fees, over-credit limit 
charges, late charges, returned check charges, and cash advance fees. Plaintiffs contend 
all of the charges, except for the finance charges, violate Pennsylvania statutory0
common law. 
 Plaintiffs filed eleven separate actions in the Courts of Common Pleas for 
Allegheny and Philadelphia counties.  The banks filed notices of removal based on federal 
question and diversity jurisdiction.  The nine cases filed in Allegheny County were 
removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, 
where they were consolidated.  The two Philadelphia County cases were removed to the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
 Plaintiffs moved to remand.  The district courts denied the motions, holding 
federal question jurisdiction existed based on the "complete preemption" doctrine.  
v. Mellon Bank (DE), 825 F. Supp. 1239, 1243 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Ament, 825 F. Supp. at 1251.  
The district court then transferred the Eastern District cases to the Western District.
 The banks filed motions to dismiss, for judgment on the pleadings and for 
summary judgment.  The district court granted the motions and dismissed all of the 
actions, holding that § 30 of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 85,0 and § 521 of the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 ("DIDA"), 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1831d (1988 & Supp. III 1991), preempted Pennsylvania's prohibition of the challenged 
fees. Ament, 849 F. Supp. at 1018-19.  The district court held that the banks' charges 
                     
0
 Plaintiffs invoke the Pennsylvania Goods and Services Installment Sales Act, Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 69, §§ 1101-2303 (West 1994); the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection Law, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, §§ 201-1 to 201-9.2 (West 1993); and the 
Pennsylvania Banking Code of 1965, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 7, §§ 101-2204 (West 1995). 
0
 Future references to § 30 of the National Bank Act, codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 85 
and 86, will be to the codified sections. 
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constituted "interest" under federal law and that plaintiffs' state law claims were 
preempted.  Id. at 1019-21. These consolidated appeals followed.  Assuming the district 
court properly had jurisdiction, we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
(1988). 
II. 
 Plaintiffs challenge the propriety of federal court removal jurisdiction in all 
but three of these cases.0 Defendant's removal petitions were premised on both federal 
question jurisdiction, via the complete preemption doctrine, and on diversity of 
citizenship.  The district court asserted subject matter jurisdiction based on complete 
preemption and therefore failed to reach diversity.  We disagree.  We find no jurisdiction 
under either the complete preemption doctrine or the diversity statute. 
 We exercise plenary review in jurisdictional matters. Packard v. Provident Nat'l 
Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1044 (3d Cir. 1993), cert denied sub nom. Upp v. Mellon Bank, N.A.
___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 440 (1993).  Removal of civil actions from state to federal court 
is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988), which provides in pertinent part: 
 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil 
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the 
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the . . . 
defendants[] to the district court of the United States for the 
district and division embracing the place where such action is 
pending. 
Removal is therefore premised on original jurisdiction, which in turn must rest on either 
federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or on diversity jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §1332. 
                     
0
 There is no dispute that jurisdiction was proper in Deffner v. Corestates Bank
No. 94-3217, Szydlik v. Associates National Bank, No. 94-3216, and Bartlam v. Bank of 
America, No. 94-3217, because these cases all contained federal questions on the face of 
the plaintiffs' amended complaints.  The discussion in part II of this opinion is 
therefore not relevant to these cases.   
16 
 We first consider federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the 
basis upon which the district court found jurisdiction.  In determining whether a federal 
question is raised, the "well-pleaded complaint" rule applies.  Railway Labor Executives 
Ass'n v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 858 F.2d 936, 939 (3d Cir. 1988).  This rule 
requires the federal question be presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded 
complaint in order for the case to be removable under § 1441. See Gully v. First Nat'l 
Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13 (1936).  The presence of a federal defense does not make a case 
removable even if the defense is preemption and even if the federal defense is the only 
issue in the case.  Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987).  The well
pleaded complaint rule "makes the plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may avoid 
federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law."  Id. at 392.   
 The doctrine of complete preemption is a narrow corollary to the well-pleaded 
complaint rule.  The Supreme Court explained the doctrine in Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 
393 (citation omitted): 
On occasion, the Court has concluded that the pre-emptive force of a statute is 
so "extraordinary" that it "converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into 
one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule." . 
. .  Once an area of state law has been completely pre-empted, any claim 
purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its 
inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law. 
 
 The complete preemption doctrine is of recent vintage. Since 1968, the Supreme 
Court has found complete preemption expressly in only two settings:  (1) for claims 
alleging a breach of a collective bargaining agreement that fall under § 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988), see Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 
No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968); and (2) for claims for benefits or enforcement of rights 
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) 
(1988), see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-67 (1987).0  The Court 
                     
0
 The Supreme Court also implicitly found complete preemption in Oneida Indian 
Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 675 (1974), based on the exclusive application 
of federal law to claims regarding tribal rights to Indian lands.  Id. at 667; see 
17 
has applied the doctrine "primarily in cases raising claims pre-empted by § 301 of the 
LMRA."  Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 393.  Other courts of appeals have cautiously 
extended the boundaries of the complete preemption doctrine in some instances0 but refused 
to expand the doctrine in others.0  
 This court has adopted a two-pronged test by which a federal court may determine 
whether it is authorized to assert complete preemption jurisdiction.  Pursuant to the 
test, a court determines the "very limited area in which a federal court in a case removed 
from a state court is authorized to recharacterize what purports to be a state law claim 
as a claim arising under a federal statute."  Railway Labor, 858 F.2d at 942.  First, the 
court must determine that "the statute relied upon by the defendant as preemptive contains 
civil enforcement provisions within the scope of which the plaintiff's state claim falls." 
Id. at 942 (citing Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 24, 26). Second, the court must find 
"a clear indication of a Congressional intention to permit removal despite the plaintiff's 
                                                                                          
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 n.8 (1987) (observing the Court's implicit 
use of complete preemption in Oneida). 
 
 The reach of complete preemption in these areas of federal law is closely 
circumscribed.  For example, it is only claims that rely on interpretation of a collective 
bargaining agreement that are completely preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. Caterpillar
U.S. at 394.  Not all claims relating to ERISA are completely preempted for purposes of 
removal jurisdiction. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 
1, 25 (1983); see also Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(observing the limited nature of complete preemption over ERISA claims).  
0
 See, e.g., M. Nahas & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 930 F.2d 608, 612 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(holding complete preemption applies to § 85 and § 86 of the National Bank Act, 12 
§§ 85 & 86); Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., 1 F.3d 225, 232-33 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding 
complete preemption applies to § 301 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301); Trans World 
Airlines v. Mattox, 897 F.2d 773, 787 (5th Cir.) (holding complete preemption applies to 
§ 105(a)(1) of the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1305), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 926 
(1990). 
0
 See, e.g., Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 963 F.2d 1142, 1144-45 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(refusing to extend the complete preemption doctrine to the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y); Robinson v. Michigan Consol. Gas 
Co., 918 F.2d 579, 585 (6th Cir. 1990) (refusing to extend the complete preemption 
doctrine to suits against trustees in bankruptcy); Aaron v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.
876 F.2d 1157, 1166 (5th Cir. 1989) (refusing to extend the complete preemption doctrine 
to § 5 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 1074 (1990). 
18 
exclusive reliance on state law."  Id.; see also Goepel v. National Postal Mail Handlers 
Union, 36 F.3d 306, 311 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 1691 (1995); 
Krashna v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 895 F.2d 111, 114 (3d Cir. 1990).    
 The first prong of the test requires a comparison between the federal statute's 
enforcement provisions and the nature of the plaintiffs' claims.  We must ask if the 
National Bank Act's and DIDA's civil enforcement provisions, 12 U.S.C. §§ 86 and 1831d, 
govern the same interests plaintiffs seek to vindicate in their suits.  See Allstate Ins. 
Co. v. 65 Security Plan, 879 F.2d 90, 93-94 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 Section 86 of the National Bank Act sets forth the civil enforcement provision 
for individuals charged excessive interest by national banks: 
The taking, receiving, reserving, or charging a rate of interest 
greater than is allowed by section 85 of this title, when knowingly 
done, shall be deemed a forfeiture of the entire interest which the 
note, bill, or other evidence of debt carries with it, or which has 
been agreed to be paid thereon.  In case the greater rate of interest 
has been paid, the person by whom it has been paid, or his legal 
representatives, may recover back, in an action in the nature of an 
action of debt, twice the amount of the interest thus paid from the 
association taking or receiving the same:  Provided, That such action 
is commenced within two years from the time the usurious transaction 
occurred. 
12 U.S.C. § 86.  This section contains the exclusive remedy for borrowers to enforce the 
terms of § 85 of the National Bank Act0 and to recover impermissible loan fees collected 
by national banks.  M. Nahas, 930 F.2d at 610; see also McCollum v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank
                     
0Section 85 provides in part: 
 
 Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any 
loan or discount made, or upon any notes, bills of exchange, or other 
evidences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the law of the 
State, Territory, or District where the bank is located, or at a rate 
of 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day 
commercial paper . . . and no more, except that where by the laws of 
any State a different rate is limited for banks organized under state 
laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for associations organized 
or existing in any such State under title 62 of the Revised Statutes. 
 
12 U.S.C. § 85.  This usury provision establishes the allowable rates of interest a 
national bank can charge its customers. 
19 
303 U.S. 245, 248 (1938); Evans v. National Bank of Savannah, 251 U.S. 108, 109, 114 
(1919); Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 34-35 (1875). 
 Section 521 of DIDA sets forth the civil enforcement provision for individuals 
charged excessive interest by federally insured state banks: 
 
[T]he taking, receiving, reserving, or charging a rate of interest 
greater than is allowed by subsection (a) of this section,0 when 
knowingly done, shall be deemed a forfeiture of the entire interest 
which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt carries with it, or 
which has been agreed to be paid thereon.  If such greater rate of 
interest has been paid, the person who paid it may recover in a civil 
action commenced in a court of appropriate jurisdiction not later than 
two years after the date of such payment, an amount equal to twice the 
amount of the interest paid from such State bank or such insured 
branch of a foreign bank taking, receiving, reserving, or charging 
such interest. 
12 U.S.C. § 1831d(b) (footnote supplied).  This section is identical to § 86 in all 
material respects, and Congress wrote it to duplicate the scope of § 86.  Cf. Greenwood 
Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 826 & n.7 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting the identity 
of language between the first part of § 521 of DIDA  
                     
0
 Subsection (a) provides in part: 
 
In order to prevent discrimination against State-chartered insured 
depository institutions, including insured savings banks, or insured 
branches of foreign banks with respect to interest rates, if the 
applicable rate prescribed in this subsection exceeds the rate such 
State bank or insured branch of a foreign bank would be permitted to 
charge in the absence of this subsection, such State bank or such 
insured branch of a foreign bank may, notwithstanding any State 
constitution or statute which is hereby preempted for the purposes of 
this section, take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or 
discount made, or upon any note, bill of exchange, or other evidence 
of debt, interest at a rate of not more than 1 per centum in excess of 
the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper . . . or at the rate 
allowed by the laws of the State, territory, or district where the 
bank is located, whichever may be greater. 
 
12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a). 
20 
and § 85 of the National Bank Act), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 113 S. Ct. 974 (1993).  The 
scope of the two sections is identical, and the interests covered by § 86 are the same as 
those covered by § 521.   
 The banks correctly assert that the interests the cardholders seek to vindicate 
are the same as those protected by both federal statutes.  Plaintiffs' causes of action 
under state law rest on complaints that national banks and federally insured state-
chartered banks charged impermissible fees in connection with credit card loans.  Recovery 
of impermissible loan fees is precisely the interest that § 86 of the National Bank Act 
and §521 of DIDA govern.0  This satisfies the first prong of the test for complete 
preemption. 
 The second prong of the complete preemption analysis, in which we examine 
congressional intent, presents a closer question.  Congress has broad authority to control 
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.  See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 
                     
0
 Our decision on this point does not, as plaintiffs assert, impermissibly r
the merits of the case.  Plaintiffs claim a holding that there is an identity of interest 
between their cause of action and §§ 85 and 86 reads the phrase "credit related charges" 
into the term "interest" as used in the statute. This, plaintiffs conclude, is a ruling on 
the merits of the banks' preemption defense and impermissible because "the merits may not 
be considered when deciding a 'complete preemption' jurisdictional issue."  Appellants' 
Consol. Br. at 16.  
 
 The district court did not reach the merits prematurely, nor do we.  In the 
typical case, jurisdiction is present if the complaint "sets forth a substantial claim 
[under federal law]," and the merits are not reached in making that determination.  
Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105, 108 (1933). 
 
 Here, in the removal context, our jurisdictional inquiry asks first whether 
there is an identity of interests between the federal civil enforcement provision and the 
claims at issue and second whether Congress intended to permit removal. Although 
addressing these two questions touches on the merits, it does not decide the merits.  If 
we determine at the jurisdictional stage that there is the requisite identity of interest 
between the federal and the state causes of action, we will nevertheless be free to decide 
that the fees at issue are not encompassed within the term "interest" in the federal 
statutes.  See also Ament, 825 F. Supp. at 1249 (stating that "[t]his court need not 
decide whether the fees and charges at issue in this case actually constitute 'interest' 
for the purposes of these sections; to do so would be to address the merits of the 
controversy, which this court need not -- and should not -- do when deciding the 
jurisdictional issue"). 
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226, 233-34 (1922) (observing that, aside from the Supreme Court, "[e]very other court 
created by the general government derives its jurisdiction wholly from the authority of 
Congress").  Accordingly, the existence of removal jurisdiction in a particular case turns 
on whether Congress has granted it. 
 In concluding that Congress intended to permit removal in cases implicating §§ 
85 and 86 of the National Bank Act, the district courts held that Congress manifested its 
intent to completely preempt the area by creating an exclusive federal remedy for usury 
claims against national banks.  Goehl, 825 F. Supp. at 1243; Ament, 825 F. Supp. at 1251.  
By so holding, the trial courts misapplied the second prong of the test laid out in 
Railway Labor as a matter of law.   
 The district courts relied on the reasoning of M. Nahas & Co. v. First Nat'l 
Bank, 930 F.2d 608, 612 (8th Cir. 1991), a case in which the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit found § 86 of the National Bank Act to be "an exclusive federal remedy, 
created by Congress over 100 years ago to prevent the application of overly-punitive state 
law usury penalties against national banks."  The plaintiff in M. Nahas brought suit in 
state court against a national bank, alleging that the bank charged an interest rate that 
was usurious under state law.  The bank removed the action to federal district court, and 
the court refused to remand, holding that the claim was properly characterized as fede
The circuit court affirmed. 
 The M. Nahas holding applied on its face to an instance in which a bank charged 
a percentage interest rate higher than that allowed by state law.  Following M. Nahas
however, numerous district courts have held that the National Bank Act completely preempts 
state laws that limit or prohibit late fees and other such fees charged by national 
banks.0  Moreover, a district court in the Eighth Circuit extended the M. Nahas holding to 
                     
0
 See, e.g., Watson v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 837 F. Supp. 146 (S.D. Cal. 1993); 
Tikkanen v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 801 F. Supp. 270 (D. Minn. 1992); Nelson v. Citibank 
(S.D.), N.A., 794 F. Supp. 312 (D. Minn. 1992). 
22 
§521 of DIDA, where the plaintiffs challenged late fees and over-limit charges pursuant to 
state law.  See Hill v. Chemical Bank, 799 F. Supp. 948 (D. Minn. 1992).  The court held 
that "like § 86 [of the National Bank Act], § 521(b) creates an exclusive federal remedy" 
and therefore "completely preempts the field of usury claims against federally-insured 
state banks."  Id. at 952. 
 Although the banks rely on M. Nahas and its progeny to support their argument in 
favor of federal jurisdiction, none of the cases are binding on this court.  Moreover, 
they are inconsistent with this court's previous opinions regarding complete preemption, 
because they do not convincingly establish congressional intent to make causes of action 
within the scope of §§ 85 and 86 of the National Bank Act, or § 521 of DIDA, removable to 
federal court.0    
 Indeed, the Eighth Circuit has rejected expressly the two-pronged complete 
preemption analysis that this court set forth in Railway Labor.  See Deford v. Soo Line 
R.R. Co., 867 F.2d 1080, 1086 (8th Cir.) (rejecting this court's reasoning in Railway 
Labor and holding that the Railway Labor Act completely preempts state law claims), 
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 Cardholders argue that City National Bank v. Edmisten, 681 F.2d 942 (4th 
1982), a case in which the Fourth Circuit addressed complete preemption in the context of 
§ 86, further undermines M. Nahas.  The posture and the facts of that case, however, make 
it distinguishable from the present actions.  In City National Bank, "five national banks 
and two state-chartered federally insured banks sought a declaratory judgment from the 
district court that an annual `membership fee' which they propose[d] to charge holders of 
bank credit cards would not violate North Carolina's usury laws if added to the interest 
currently charged on credit card accounts."  Id. at 943.  Unlike the present case, the 
question at issue was which North Carolina provision applied to the plaintiffs' credit 
card program if the program included annual users' fees.  Stating that "[t]he only 
connection between [the] case and § 85 [was] the fact that § 85 incorporates state law in 
the regulation of the interest chargeable by a national bank," the court concluded:
 
Plaintiffs could defend an action under state usury law on the ground that § 86 
provides the exclusive remedy for usury against a national bank, but the 
availability of this defense does not convert the threatened action from a state 
to a federal one for purposes of determining federal jurisdiction. 
 
Id. at 945-46 (citations omitted).   
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denied, 492 U.S. 927 (1989); see also, Goepel, 36 F.3d at 315 n.12 (acknowledging the 
split between the two courts of appeals).  The Eighth Circuit called the Third Circuit's 
approach "unnecessarily narrow," stating: 
Not only must we look to affirmative congressional intent and civil enforcement 
provisions, but we must also look to such factors as the history and purpose of 
the statute.  Recent case law illustrating the federal nature of the statute and 
analogous statutes with complete preemptive powers are also informative. 
 
Id.  Although an examination of Congress's basic goals in enacting §§ 85 and 86 and the 
history behind them would be consistent with the Eighth Circuit's approach, such an 
approach would diverge from that which this court has prescribed.0 Moreover, it is at odds 
with the Supreme Court's narrow application of the complete preemption doctrine. 
 The Supreme Court has held affirmative evidence of congressional intent to be 
"the touchstone of the federal district court's removal jurisdiction."  Metropolitan Life
481 U.S. at 66.  And, as discussed above, the Court has found such intent only rarely.  
The complete preemption doctrine was originally rooted in a cause of action arising under 
§ 301 of the LMRA.  See Avco Corp., 390 U.S. at 557.  The Court extended the doctrine 
reluctantly, in Metropolitan Life, to an action arising under ERISA.  The Court wrote that 
it did so only because "ERISA's civil enforcement provisions closely parallels [sic] that 
of § 301 of the LMRA," and because explicit language in the ERISA Conference Report 
analogized the ERISA provision to the LMRA language.  Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 65; 
Railway Labor, 858 F.2d at 940.  "In the absence of explicit direction from Congress," the 
Court wrote, 
[e]ven with a provision such as § 502(a)(1)(B) [the jurisdictional provision] 
that lies at the heart of a statute with the unique pre-emptive force of ERISA . 
. . we would be reluctant to find that extraordinary pre-emptive power, such as 
has been found with respect to 301 of the LMRA, that converts an ordinary state 
                     
0
 See Allstate Ins. Co., 879 F.2d at 93 (holding that complete preemption requires 
"affirmative evidence of a congressional intent to permit removal despite the plaintiff's 
exclusive reliance on state law"); see also Goepel, 36 F.3d at 311 (formulating the 
requirement as one of clear congressional intent); Krashna, 895 F.2d at 114 (same); 
Railway Labor, 858 F.2d at 942 (same).   
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common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well
pleaded complaint rule.   
 
Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 64-65.0   
 Neither the National Bank Act nor DIDA contains a jurisdictional provision 
evidencing congressional intent to permit removal of the sort relied upon in Avco and 
Metropolitan Life.  Nor have the banks pointed to congressional language suggesting that 
parties may bring suit against banks in federal court without regard to the citizenship of 
the parties or the amount in controversy.  
 Congressional intent to permit removal based on complete preemption would be 
difficult to divine from the legislative history of the National Bank Act, because the Act 
was passed in 1864, pre-dating federal question jurisdiction, the well-pleaded complaint 
rule, and the doctrine of complete preemption.0  The banks argue, nonetheless, that
Congress evidenced an intent to provide an exclusive source of relief for claims of 
overcharge that, coupled with the general federal provision allowing for removal of 
federal-question cases, demonstrates congressional intent to allow removal.  However, t
defendants point to nothing in the legislative history of §§ 85 and 86 that presents the 
sort of clear indication of congressional intent we have looked for in the past.0 
                     
0
 The Court's refusal to extend the complete preemption doctrine in subsequent 
cases further indicates its conservative approach in applying the complete preemption 
doctrine.  See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 1 (reading § 502(a) of ERISA narrowly to 
forbid removal of a suit by the state to enforce tax levies against an employee pension 
plan); Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 386 (finding a reference in an affirmative defense 
to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement insufficient to convert plaintiff's 
state law breach of contract claims into a claim under § 301 of the LMRA). 
0
 Congress granted general original jurisdiction over federal question cases and 
provided for general removal power in 1875.  Judiciary Act of 1875, §§ 1, 2, 18 Stat. 470.
0
 See Allstate Ins. Co., 879 F.2d at 94 (finding no removal jurisdiction based on 
complete preemption where first prong was not met and where the court found no "evidence 
of an intent on the part of Congress to permit removal of the type of state-law claims 
made by [the plaintiff] . . . in cases where the plaintiff exclusively relies on state 
law"); Railway Labor, 858 F.2d at 943 (declining to find removal jurisdiction based on 
complete preemption where there was no federal cause of action within the scope of which 
the plaintiff's state claim fell and where the court did "not find the requisite 
Congressional intent"). 
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 Similarly, when Congress enacted § 521 of DIDA in 1980, it did not adopt 
language or indicate in the legislative history that the provision would support complete 
preemption.  Cf. Donald v. Golden 1 Credit Union, 839 F. Supp. 1394, 1402 (E.D. Cal. 1993) 
(refusing to find complete preemption pursuant to § 523(b) of DIDA -- which contains 
parallel language to § 521 but governs insured credit unions -- because nothing in the 
provision's legislative history "mentions 'arising under' jurisdiction or compares the 
effect of § 523(b) to § 301 of the LMRA or § 502(f) of ERISA").    
 There appears to be no indication that Congress intended to completely preempt 
the regulation of national banks or federally-insured state lending institutions.0  
Therefore, we will reverse the judgments of the district courts that found complete 
preemption.  Jurisdiction cannot rest on 28 U.S.C. §1331. 
 The district court did not consider diversity jurisdiction.  Because we do not 
find jurisdiction based on complete preemption, we must do so.  Although this issue was 
                     
0
 Accord Copeland v. MBNA America, N.A., 820 F. Supp. 537, 540-41 (D. Colo. 1993) 
(refusing to apply the complete preemption doctrine pursuant to §§ 85 and 86 of the 
National Bank Act, in a case challenging late fees imposed pursuant to a credit card 
agreement, upon concluding "that a proposition that is not obvious from the plain meaning 
of a statute's language, nor from its legislative history, simply cannot be regarded as a 
clear manifestation of congressional intent"); Donald, 839 F. Supp. at 1403 (finding no 
complete preemption in § 523 of DIDA).  But see M. Nahas, 930 F.2d at 612; Watson, 837 F. 
Supp. at 149. 
 
 We also observe that to the extent the dissent finds in Congressional 
pronouncements, the statutory scheme, and the historical context a need for "uniform 
federal construction of the Act," Dissenting Opinion at 1, this goal is ably achieved by 
our federal system without the extreme step of complete preemption.  We are confident that 
the United States Supreme Court will continue to uphold its historic role in resolving 
conflicts that may arise among the state supreme courts.  28 U.S.C. § 1257 ("Final 
judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a state . . . may be reviewed by the 
Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the 
United States is drawn in question . . . ."); see Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 
Wheat) 304, 347-48 (1816) (finding rationale for appellate review of state tribunals by 
United States Supreme Court in "the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of 
decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the 
constitution").  Moreover, should the "vagaries of different states' interpretations" 
yield truly disastrous results, Congress retains the power to revisit the issue.  The 
dissent's concerns, however valid, are simply not the stuff of which complete preemption 
is made. 
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not raised in the parties' briefs, defendants have presented the issue in a supplemental 
motion.  Moreover, as a court of limited jurisdiction we have a duty to raise potential 
jurisdictional issues sua sponte.  Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Crown Cork & Seal Co.
F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir. 1990); Trent Realty Assoc. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of 
Philadelphia, 657 F.2d 29, 36 (3d Cir. 1981).  We find that the requirements for 
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship are not met. 
 We observe initially that the cases consolidated before us each purport to 
advance the interests of a class, but not one has been certified as a class action.  Our 
position is therefore analogous to our previous decision in Packard, 994 F.2d at 1043 n.2 
(noting that no class was ever certified).  Despite the absence of certification, class 
action principles still apply: To support diversity jurisdiction, there must be complete 
diversity between the named representatives of the class and the defendants, In re School 
Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d 1310, 1317 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. U.S. Gypsum Co. 
v. Barnwell Sch. Dist. No. 45, 499 U.S. 976 (1991), and each member of the class must meet 
the statutorily required minimum amount in controversy, In re Corestates Trust Fee Litig.
39 F.3d 61, 64 (3d Cir. 1994).  We also observe that because the issue of diversity 
jurisdiction arises on removal, the defendant bears the burden of proving the statutory 
requirements.  Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921); Columbia Gas 
Transmission Corp. v. Tarbuck, 62 F.3d 538, 541 (3d Cir. 1995). All doubts on removal are 
resolved in favor of remand.  Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1085 (1991); Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 
26, 29 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 Diversity jurisdiction founders on the amount in controversy requirement.  28 
U.S.C. § 1332(b).0  As the party asserting jurisdiction, defendants must demonstrate that 
                     
0
 Because of our holding on this requirement, we need not consider § 1332's 
complete diversity requirement.  See Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 
(1978); Field v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 626 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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each member of the plaintiff class alleges an amount in controversy greater than $50,000.  
Id.  In assessing the amount claimed where the defendant seeks removal, we place great 
confidence in the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint, because we presume that the 
plaintiff has not claimed an excessive amount in order to obtain federal jurisdicti
St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938); Albright v. R. J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 531 F.2d 132, 134 (3d Cir.) (recognizing different standard for 
evaluating jurisdictional amount on removal compared to original jurisdiction), cert. 
denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976). Moreover, a plaintiff who has a claim for more than the 
jurisdictional amount may choose to sue for a lesser amount to avoid the monetary 
threshold for removal.  St. Paul, 303 U.S. at 292; Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 
1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994); Gafford v. General Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 157 (6th Cir. 
1993).  Accordingly, the defendant who seeks removal and challenges either explicitly or 
implicitly the jurisdictional amount alleged by the plaintiff faces a heavy burden.  
Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch & Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 1012 n.6 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(discussing challenge to joinder of non-diverse defendant to defeat diversity), cert. 
dismissed sub nom. American Standard, Inc. v. Steel Valley Auth., 484 U.S. 1021 (1988).
 In the case before us, defendants have failed to carry this burden.  It cannot 
be alleged seriously that the amounts sought by any individual plaintiff exceed $50,000, 
even accounting for the possibility of treble damages under certain Pennsylvania consumer 
protection statutes.  Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 69, § 2204 (West 1994); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, 
§ 201-9.2 (West 1993).  The individual plaintiffs sue for a variety of charges ranging 
from a $2 fee per cash advance to a $60 annual fee, with the vast majority of the charges 
hovering in the $10-$18 range.0 It is well-settled that members of a class cannot 
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 Ament paid an annual fee of $18 and late fee of $10, App. at 11a; Caplan an 
annual fee of $18 and a late payment charge of $15, App. at 2; Szydik a late payment fee 
of $15, App. at 309a; Thompson an annual fee of $18, App. at 369a; Tompkins a late payment 
fee of $10 and a cash advance fee of $2 in his action against American General Financial 
Center, App. at 596a-97a, and an annual fee of $20 and a late fee of $10 in his action 
against Chase Manhattan Bank, App. at 644a-45a; Spellman at least one late charge of 
28 
aggregate their claims to exceed the jurisdictional threshold.  Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 
332, 338 (1969).  Each class member must claim the requisite amount in controversy.  
v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973).  None of the individual claims will 
support diversity jurisdcition.0 
 Absent aggregation, three possible routes to the $50,000 minimum lie open.  
Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief prohibiting the defendants from receiving, charging, or 
contracting for the challenged fees.  If the value of the injunction sought is viewed from 
the defendants' perspective, it could produce a loss in revenue exceeding the statutory 
threshold.  Defendants also allege diversity jurisdiction based on the "total detriment" 
they would suffer if injunctive relief were granted.  In addition, defendants cite a 
potential recovery that could include substantial attorneys' fees.  We review each 
argument in turn. 
 We first reject the suggestion that the request for injunctive relief converts 
these individual actions for fees into a collective action for the total value of the fees 
to the defendant.  In In re Corestates Trust Fee Litig., we observed that,  
In injunctive actions, it is settled that the amount in controversy is 
measured by the value of the right sought to be protected by the 
equitable relief.  See Smith v. Adams, 130 U.S. 167, 175, 9 S.Ct. 566, 
569, 32 L.Ed. 895 (1889);  Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047, 1052 (3d 
Cir. 1972) ("In cases where there is no adequate remedy at law, the 
measure of jurisdiction is the value of the right sought to be 
protected by injunctive relief."), rev'd on other grounds Greer v. 
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976).  In other 
words, "it is the value to plaintiff to conduct his business or 
personal affairs free from the activity sought to be enjoined that is 
the yardstick for measuring the amount in controversy."  14A C. 
                                                                                          
$20.25, App. at 1163a-64a, 1180a; and Goehl various "payments" which included late fees of 
$15, App. at 1268a.  This list does not include the three cases where jurisdiction is 
properly lodged based on a federal question. 
0
 As in Packard, because no plaintiff has placed more than $50,000 at issue, we 
need not address whether 28 U.S.C. §1367's codification of supplemental jurisdiction has 
overruled Zahn where the named plaintiff claims the jurisdictional amount. 994 F.2d at 
1045 n.9.  Cf. In re Abbot Laboratories, 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995) (assigning attorneys' 
fees to class representative to meet jurisdictional amount, then asserting supplemental 
jurisdiction over the class). 
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Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3708 
at 143-44 (2d ed. 1985) (citations omitted). 
39 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1994).  Following this rule, we assessed the requested relief 
based on its value to the individual plaintiff, and we expressly rejected the contention 
that injunctive relief somehow broadened the amount at issue beyond the plaintiff's stake.  
Id. at 66.  In reaching this holding, we built on our decision in Packard, where on facts 
similar to Corestates, we held that a challenge to a small "sweep fee" levied by banks as 
part of their management of trust accounts placed in controversy only the value of the fee 
to each individual plaintiff, not the aggregate cost of the injunction to the bank.  
Packard, 994 F.2d at 1050.  We abide by these rulings in the present situation as well.  
Taken alone, plaintiffs' prayers for injunctive relief will neither convert their 
individual claims into a collective recovery, nor force us through the looking glass to 
evaluate their claims from the defendant's perspective. 
 This same authority requires us to reject defendant's second contention, the 
"total detriment" theory.  See Packard, 994 F.2d at 1050 ("allowing the amount in 
controversy to be measured by the defendant's cost would eviscerate Snyder's holding t
the claims of class members may not be aggregated in order to meet the jurisdictional 
threshold"); Brechbill v. Diner's Club, 80 F.R.D. 486 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (rejecting "total 
detriment" concept); see also Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1977).  
Allowing a defendant to inject the "total detriment" theory would give the defendant 
control over forum selection whenever a claim could be generalized beyond the individual 
plaintiff.  Our precedents dispose of this argument. 
   Finally, we turn to the issue of attorneys' fees.  It is well-settled that where 
reasonable attorneys' fees are a part of the statutory action and have been requested by 
plaintiffs, their value will be assessed as part of the amount in controversy.  Missouri 
State Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 290 U.S. 199 (1933).  Here, to satisfy the $50,000 minimum, 
attorneys' fees would have to make up the vast majority of the required quantum. Just as 
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we scrutinize a claim carefully where a request for punitive damages comprises the 
majority of the jurisdictional amount, Packard, 994 F.2d at 1046, we will look equally 
critically at any case where attorneys' fees constitute the principal basis for 
jurisdiction.  We also note that conceptually, consistent with Snyder and Zahn, attorneys' 
fees must be distributed across the class or across the claimants. See Goldberg v. CPC 
Int'l, Inc., 678 F.2d 1365, 1367 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 945 (1982); but see
re Abbott Laboratories, 51 F.3d 524, 526-27 (5th Cir. 1995) (allocating attorneys' fees to 
class representative under Louisiana class action fee recovery statute).  Hence, to 
support jurisdiction, the attorneys' fees of each individual plaintiff combined with the 
other elements of the prayer for relief must exceed the statutory minimum. 
 In a typical commercial case such as this one, we cannot believe that where each 
individual plaintiff asserts claims in the range of tens to hundreds of dollars, an 
attorney's fee exceeding $49,000 would be either reasonable or justified. See, e.g.
v. General Motors Corp., ___ F.R.D. ___, 1995 WL 653961 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 1995) (Dalzell, 
J.) (reaching similar conclusions after excellent discussion of removal issue).  A 
difference of this order of magnitude is conclusive.  Moreover, aside from their bare 
assertion that attorneys' fees would be sufficient to satisfy the statutory minimum, 
defendants have offered no proof on this issue.  Because the burden of demonstrating 
jurisdiction lies squarely on the removing defendants, we have little trouble holding that 
the potential for attorneys' fees will not satisfy the jurisdictional amount. 
 We conclude that it appears "to a legal certainty" that the claims in question 
were "for less than the jurisdictional amount."  St. Paul, 303 U.S. at 289.  In reaching
this conclusion, we continue our tradition of reading the diversity statute narrowly so as 
not to frustrate Congress' purpose in keeping the diversity caseload of the federal courts 
under some modicum of control.  Packard, 994 F.2d at 1044-45; Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 
289, 293-94 (3d Cir. 1971).  We therefore find no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  
See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 863 F. Supp. 1156, 1162-65 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (refusing 
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diversity-based removal because class members claims could not be aggregated, increased 
through punitive damages, or viewed collectively under an injunction to meet 
jurisdictional amount); Hunter v. Greenwood Trust Co., 856 F. Supp. 207, 220 (D.N.J. 1992) 
(refusing diversity-based removal in challenge to late fees on credit cards "because the 
jurisdictional amount in controversy is not satisfied"); Copeland v. MNBA America, N.A.
820 F. Supp. 537, 541-42 (D. Colo. 1993) (same). 
 We hold that both federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction are 
lacking.  Removal was therefore improper.  Consequently, we will reverse the assertion of 
jurisdiction and instruct the district judges to remand the non-California lender cases to 
the state courts. 
III. 
 Although our discussion to this point disposes of most of the cases before us, 
the three California lender cases remain. In these disputes the plaintiffs amended their 
complaints to allege specific violations of federal law, obviating the jurisdictional 
issue.  The plaintiffs in these cases raise different challenges that we now address.
A. 
 The plaintiffs in Bartlam v. Bank of America, No. 94-3217, and Deffner v. 
Corestates Bank, No. 94-3217, ask us to consider whether the district court properly 
determined that they lack standing.  Because we will affirm, we do not reach the other 
issues that these plaintiffs raise. 
 Plaintiff Bartlam brought suit against Bank of America pursuant to the National 
Bank Act and two Pennsylvania consumer protection statutes.  She challenged a late payment 
charge, a return check charge, and an over-credit limit charge based on her credit card 
agreement with Bank of America.  Bartlam concedes that she has no standing to challenge 
the credit limit charge (as no such charge was part of her credit agreement) and that she 
did not actually incur a return check charge or late fee during the relevant period.  
Nevertheless, she argues that the district court erred in deciding that she lacked 
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standing.  The National Bank Act, she asserts, creates a cause of action for usurious 
charges even if the borrower has not actually paid them but has merely contracted for 
them.  She also argues that the district court's holding on standing is inconsistent with 
its holding on complete preemption. 
 The requirements for standing are clear.  The plaintiff must have suffered an 
injury in fact, the injury must be "fairly . . . traceable to the challenged action of the 
defendant," and it must be likely the injury would be redressed by a favorable decision.  
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 501 (1975).  Bartlam did not pay the contested charges within the statute of 
limitations period in § 86 and therefore cannot meet the injury in fact requirement.  
also Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 526 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding plaintiff lacked 
standing to challenge a service charge when she had not incurred the relevant charge).
 Despite this problem, Bartlam alleges that she has standing because Bank of 
America contracted with her for the contested fees.  She contends the term "reserve" in § 
85 means "to contract,"0 and that the formation of a contract with usurious interest was 
enough to violate the terms of the statute and provide standing for a cause of action 
under § 86.  We do not agree.  The Supreme Court has explained that the term "reserve" 
refers to the practice of discounting, where a bank reduces the principal of a loan by 
deducting interest in advance: 
 
To discount, ex vi termini, implies reservation of interest in advance 
. . . . [W]e think Congress intended to endow national banks with the 
power, which banks generally exercise, of discounting notes reserving 
charges at the highest rate permitted for interest.  To carry out this 
purpose, the National Bank Act provides that associations organized 
under it may reserve on any discount interest at the rate allowed by 
the State; and only when there is reservation at a rate greater than 
the one specified does the transaction become usurious. 
                     
0
 See supra note 13 for the text of § 85. 
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Evans, 251 U.S. at 114.  This passage makes clear that "reserving" does not mean 
"contracting." 
 More importantly, regardless of how one defines "reserve," § 86 does not provide 
a cause of action unless the borrower has actually paid the interest sought to be 
recovered. McCarthy v. First Nat'l Bank, 223 U.S. 493, 498-99 (1912). Section 86 
contemplates two types of cases, those where the lender sues for usurious charges the 
borrower has not paid, and those where the borrower seeks to recover usurious interest he 
has paid.  Id.  Section 86 provides a cause of action for the latter instance, but not the 
former.  For unapid charges, § 86 provides the borrower with a defense to a suit brought 
by the bank, but it does not allow the borrower to sue directly.  Id. Thus, the National 
Bank Act does not provide a cause of action for charges for which the borrower has 
contracted but not paid. Bartlam's claim is not legally cognizable. 
 Finally, Bartlam argues that the district court's holding that complete 
preemption allowed removal is inconsistent with its holding that she lacks standing.  
Subject matter jurisdiction in this case was based on the allegation in plaintiff's 
amended complaint that Bank of America had violated 12 U.S.C. § 85.0  The district court 
had jurisdiction over the case based on this federal question, and it was not inconsistent 
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 Bartlam cannot contest the existence of federal subject matter jurisdiction 
because she amended her complaint to include a federal cause of action.  See Bernstein v
Lind-Waldock & Co., 738 F.2d 179, 185-86 (7th Cir. 1984).  In Bernstein, the court 
explained: 
 
The amended complaint was thus within the original jurisdiction of the 
federal district courts and it makes no difference that it was filed 
only because [the plaintiff's] previous suit had improperly been 
removed.  If he was convinced that the original action was not 
removable he could have stuck by his guns and we would have vindicated 
his position on appeal.  But once he decided to take advantage of his 
involuntary presence in federal court to add a federal claim to his 
complaint he was bound to remain there. 
 
Id. at 185. 
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for the district court to declare that the plaintiff lacked standing.  Moreover, complete 
preemption jurisdiction did not exist in any event.0 
 The district court's holding that Barlam lacked standing was therefore correct.  
We will affirm the district court's dismissal of Bartlam's federal claims but remand the 
matter to the district court so that it may in turn remand the case to state court.
B. 
 We next consider similar standing arguments made in Deffner.  Appellant Deffner 
filed a class action against Household, a federal savings association located in 
California, and against Corestates Bank of Delaware, N.A., a national bank located in 
Delaware, alleging that various credit card charges imposed pursuant to their credit 
agreements violated Pennsylvania state law.  Deffner subsequently amended the complaint to 
include two new federal claims against Household, alleging that Household's over-credit 
limit charges, late payment charges, and returned check charges are unlawful under 12 
                     
0
 The district court dismissed all of Bartlam's claims, including her prayer for 
declaratory and injunctive relief. Bartlam asserts that an adverse determination regarding 
her standing to bring a damages claim does not bar her claims for declaratory or 
injunctive relief.  Bartlam did not raise this argument in her initial brief before us, 
and we consider it waived.  See Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1065 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (stating that "absent extraordinary circumstances, briefs must contain 
statements of all issues presented for appeal, together with supporting arguments and 
citations"), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985 (1992).   
 
 We do note, however, that even if the issue were not waived, the result would 
not change.  The Declaratory Judgment Act provides district courts with discretion over 
whether to decide a motion for declaratory judgment.  Exxon Corp. v. F.T.C., 588 F.2d 895, 
900 (3d Cir. 1978).  We review the exercise of that discretion with some deference.  
Declaratory judgments can only issue when there is an actual controversy between the 
parties.  Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 912 F.2d 643, 647 (3d C
1990).  The boundaries of the "actual controversy" requirement are difficult to determine.  
Id.  We need not determine whether an "actual controversy" exists here, as we are 
satisfied the district court properly exercised its discretion.  Even if we were to decide 
that the district court was wrong, we "will not reverse merely because we would decide 
differently."  Exxon, 588 F.2d at 900.  The reasoning is the same for injunctive relief, 
with the same result.  We find no error here.  See also Landau v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 
N.A., 367 F. Supp. 992, 996-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding, in almost identical factual 
context, that plaintiff had shown neither injury in fact for a damages claim, nor 
sufficient likelihood of future injury to sue for injunctive or declaratory relief).
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U.S.C. § 1463(g)(2) (Supp. IV 1992), a provision of the Home Owners' Loan Act, the federal 
statute governing lending charges by federal savings associations.    
 Ultimately, Household moved for judgment against the Amended Complaint on the 
grounds that:  (1) having never incurred any of the challenged charges, Deffner lacked 
standing to bring her claims; and (2) Deffner's state law claims were preempted by federal 
law.  The trial court granted Household's motion for judgment.  Deffner argues on appeal 
that she has standing.   
 We hold Deffner lacked standing to bring the claims at issue.  Deffner did not 
incur the charges she challenges, and our discussion of standing with respect to Bartlam
supra part III.A, applies equally to this case.0  Deffner may not sue Household for 
charges that she neither paid nor incurred.   
 Furthermore, like Bartlam, Deffner lacks a statutory basis for her cause of 
action.  Section 1463(g) of the Home Owners' Loan Act contains similar language to 12 
U.S.C. §§ 85 and 86.0  Section 1463(g) is not identical to §§ 85 and 86, but the only 
                     
0
 We also apply the holding regarding Bartlam's claim for injunctive and 
declaratory relief to Deffner's claims.  See supra note 25. 
0
 The section provides: 
 
(g) Preemption of State usury laws 
 
 (1)  Notwithstanding any State law, a savings association may 
charge interest on any extension of credit at a rate of not more than 
1 percent in excess of the discount rate on 90-day commercial paper in 
effect at the Federal Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve district in 
which such savings association is located or at the rate allowed by 
the laws of the State in which such savings association is located, 
whichever is greater. 
 
 (2)  If the rate prescribed in paragraph (1) exceeds the rate 
such savings association would be permitted to charge in the absence 
of this subsection, the receiving or charging a greater rate of 
interest than that prescribed by paragraph (1), when knowingly done, 
shall be deemed a forfeiture of the entire interest which the 
extension of credit carries with it, or which has been agreed to be 
paid thereon.  If such greater rate of interest has been paid, the 
person who paid it may recover, in a civil action commenced in a court 
of appropriate jurisdiction not later than 2 years after the date of 
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material difference between the sections weakens Deffner's argument.0  As discussed, 
part III.A, Bartlam attempted to find a cause of action for unpaid fees in the "reserving" 
language of § 86.  This language is not part of 12 U.S.C. §1463(g)(2), which provides the 
exclusive remedy for violations of the usury provision of the Home Owner's Loan Act.  The 
remedy provision of § 1463(g)(2) prohibits only "receiving" or "charging" a usurious rate 
of interest, which Household has not done.  Thus Deffner cannot even make Bartlam's 
argument, which we rejected, that the statute is intended to cover contractual 
arrangements.  Like Bartlam, Deffer has no cause of action and no standing. 
 We need not determine whether Deffner's state claims are substantively preempted 
by § 1463(g).0  Since Deffner lacks standing to bring her federal claims, we remand this 
case to the district court with instructions to remand the state law issues to state 
court.   
C. 
 Finally, the plaintiff in Szydlik v. Associates Nat'l Bank, No. 94-3216, argues 
that the district court erred in dismissing his case.  Szydlik challenges returned check 
charges, late fees, and over-limit fees.  He alleges that the district court improperly 
dismissed his case sua sponte and erred in determining that California law allowed the 
charges that Associates National Bank imposed.  We will first address a preliminary 
procedural point, then assess standing issues, and finally reach the merits of certain of 
Szydlik's claims.  
                                                                                          
such payment, an amount equal to twice the amount of the interest paid 
from the savings association taking or receiving such interest. 
 
12 U.S.C. § 1463(g) (emphasis added). 
0
 The statutory structure of 12 U.S.C. § 1463(g)(2) creates a defense in the first 
clause and a cause of action in the second, in a manner analogous to § 86. 
0
 We note, however, that because § 1463(g)'s language is clearly based on §
the definition of interest in § 1463(g) has the same scope as § 85.  Moreover, the 
legislative history strongly indicates that Congress intended a particularly broad scope 
of interest for § 1463, as Congress specifically noted interest should include all "loan 
related charges."  H.R. Rep. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 343 (1989), 
reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 139. 
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 Szydlik presents a preliminary procedural argument, in which he contends that 
because Associates National Bank never filed a dispositive motion, the district court 
erred in dismissing his claims.  The district court dismissed Szydlik's claims on Ap
12, 1994.  Tompkins v. American General Financial Center, No. 92-375, slip op. at 1 (W.D. 
Pa. Apr. 12, 1994) ("April 12, 1994, Order").  In its April 12, 1994, Order, the district 
court referred to its Order of June 21, 1993, in which it had stated that "[any] 
defendants who have not yet filed a motion to dismiss are assumed to agree with the 
motions to dismiss and corresponding briefs already filed, unless the court is notified 
otherwise by July 2, 1993."  Ament v. PNC Nat'l Bank, No. 92-244, slip op. at 3 (W.D. Pa. 
June 21, 1993) ("June 21, 1993, Order").  Szydlik argues the June 21, 1993, Order applies 
only to dispositive motions filed before that Order.  Szydlik asserts that because no 
defendant filed a dispositive motion addressing the issues of California law relevant to 
Szydlik's claims prior to June 21, 1993, the district court's dismissal of his claim was 
sua sponte and improper.   
 The essence of this argument is that because Associates National Bank did not 
file a specific dispositive motion it was barred from benefitting from motions filed by 
other defendants. Szydlik's argument reads the district court's June 21, 1993, Order, 
which was based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), too narrowly.  The district 
court sought to avoid repetitive briefing for issues common to the consolidated cases and 
gave clear notice of its intention to apply the defendants' dispositive motions to all of 
the cases, including Szydlik's. Hence, there is no merit to his preliminary point. 
 Next, we must consider standing.  Szydlik does not allege that he ever incurred 
a return check charge, and therefore we hold that he lacks standing on that claim, based 
on the reasoning of our discussion of Bartlam v. Bank of America, No. 94-3217.  See
part III.A.  Szydlik did incur both late fees and over-limit fees of fifteen dollars each, 
and we must therefore consider the merits of these claims.  He contends that California 
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law does not permit any other lender to assess these charges and that Associates National 
Bank's imposition of them is therefore usurious. 
 The district court disposed of Szydlik's late fee and over-limit fee claims on 
preliminary motion.  Although we are hampered somewhat because the basis for the district 
court's dismissal of Szydlik's claims is unclear, Tompkins v. American General Financial 
Center, No. 92-375 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 1994) (order of dismissal), we review the district 
court's grant of dismissal motions under a plenary standard.  Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 
682, 685 (3d Cir. 1993).    
 We must first determine whether Szydlik's state law claims are substantively 
preempted by the National Bank Act.0   Szydlik argues that the word "interest" as used in 
§ 85 of the National Bank Act does not encompass the contested charges and that federal 
law therefore does not preempt state law in the present dispute.  We disagree. 
 We note initially that ordinary preemption differs from complete preemption.  
Railway Labor, 858 F.2d at 942 (citing Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 398).  The former is 
a question of what substantive law -- federal or state -- should control a claim brought 
pursuant to state law.  Krashna, 895 F.2d at 114 n.3; Hunter v. Greenwood Trust Co.
F. Supp. 207, 212 n.2 (D.N.J. 1992).  As this court has held, "[s]tate courts are 
competent to determine whether state law has been preempted by federal law and they must 
be permitted to perform that function in cases brought before them, absent a Congressional 
intent to the contrary."  Railway Labor, 858 F.2d at 942. 
                     
0
 Szydlik alleged in his amended complaint that the defendant bank (or banks) 
violated the Pennsylvania Goods and Services Installment Sales Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 
69, §§ 1101-2303 (West 1994), "by contracting for, reserving, charging and receiving late 
payment charges pursuant to the credit card agreements" at issue, "by contracting for, 
reserving, charging and receiving return check charges pursuant to the credit card 
agreements," and "by contracting for, reserving, charging and receiving over credit limit 
charges pursuant to the credit card agreements."  Moreover, he alleges that Associates 
National Bank made false and misleading misrepresentations in credit card agreements in 
violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, P
Stat. Ann. tit. 73, §§201-1 to 201-9.2 (West 1993). 
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 The question of when federal law preempts state law under the Supremacy Clause, 
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, is one of congressional intent.  English v. General Elec. Co.
496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990).  Preemption occurs in three circumstances:  when Congress uses 
explicit statutory language to express its intent; when state law attempts to regulate 
conduct in an area Congress intended the federal government to occupy exclusively; and 
when state law actually conflicts with federal law.  Id. at 79.  The Court has noted, 
however, that 
 
[b]y referring to these three categories, we should not be taken to 
mean that they are rigidly distinct.  Indeed, field pre-emption may be 
understood as a species of conflict pre-emption:  a state law that 
falls within a pre-empted field conflicts with Congress' intent 
(either express or plainly implied) to exclude state regulation.  
Nevertheless, because we previously have adverted to the three-
category framework, we invoke and apply it here. 
Id. at 79 n.5.  The Supreme Court recently clarified the preemption inquiry further, 
noting that implied preemption can co-exist with an express preemption clause.  
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 1483, 1487 (1995).  Our task of 
determining which category of preemption applies is made simple: lacking express language 
of preemption in § 85, we are left with field and conflict preemption, which the Supreme 
Court has made clear we need not worry about distinguishing.0 
 Congress did not specifically define the term "interest" in these statutes.  
While we always start the task of interpretation with the plain meaning of a statute, the 
meaning here is ambiguous.  Although Szydlik argues that "interest" can only apply to 
                     
0
 It has been argued that the determination of field preemption is tautological:
 
Little aid can be derived from the vague and illusory but often 
repeated formula that Congress "by occupying the field" has excluded 
from it all state legislation. Every Act of Congress occupies some 
field, but we must know the boundaries of that field before we can say 
that it has precluded a state from the exercise of any power reserved 
to it by the Constitution. 
 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 78-79 (1941) (Stone, J., dissenting). 
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charges in the form of periodic percentage rates, we do not believe the term is either so 
limited in meaning or so self-defining.  The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has 
held that "interest" in § 521 of DIDA does not have a plain meaning limited to "numerical 
interest rates."  Greenwood Trust, 971 F.2d at 824-25.  The First Circuit's persuasive 
analysis is relevant to our inquiry because of the similarity between § 521 of DIDA and 
§ 85 of the National Bank Act.  Additionally, Webster's Dictionary defines "interest" as 
"the price paid for borrowing money generally expressed as a percentage of the amount 
borrowed paid in one year."  Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1178 (1964) 
(emphasis added). 
 Szydlik contends that a plain meaning can be found in the common law definition 
of "interest."  We do not agree.  We agree with the court in Tikkanen v. Citibank (S.D.), 
N.A., 801 F. Supp. 270, 278 (D. Minn. 1992), which responded to a similar argument: 
 
[Plaintiffs] rely on cases from a handful of jurisdictions to support 
the proposition that late fees cannot be considered interest under 
'the common law,' as if there were a uniform law of usury applicable 
in all fifty states. . . .  Usury statutes and the case law construing 
them vary from state to state; that variation is in fact the genesis 
of these actions. 
Szydlik and the other plaintiffs in this case have relied upon similar authority, which we 
reject.  Lacking a clear plain meaning of the term "interest," we turn to congressional 
purpose. 
 The legislative history of the National Bank Act is not especially helpful in 
establishing the exact scope Congress intended "interest" to have.  Although Congress had 
considered establishing a uniform national rate of interest that the national banks could 
charge, it ultimately rejected the idea and designed a system "to place the national banks 
in each State on precisely the same footing with individuals and persons doing business in 
the State by its laws."  Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2126 (1864).  The language on 
interest was designed to create a mechanism for national banks to be able to charge what 
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state lenders could charge for loans, so that national banks would be immune from 
"unfriendly State legislation."  Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 
409, 412 (1874). 
 While instructive, the legislative history does not clearly establish the 
intended scope of "interest" in § 85, so we will consider the section's purpose.  Section 
85 authorizes a national bank to charge the interest allowed by the state where the bank 
is located to its customers around the country. Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha 
Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 313-18 (1978).  Known as the "exportation" principle, it allows 
a bank to impose interest charges allowed by the laws of its home state on out-of-state 
customers.  Greenwood Trust, 971 F.2d at 827.  For example, the exportation principle 
makes it lawful for a bank located outside of Pennsylvania to impose interest charges on 
cardholders in Pennsylvania if the bank's home state allows those charges.  It does not 
matter if those charges are unlawful under Pennsylvania law as long as the charges are 
"interest" and thus within the scope of §§ 85 and 86. 
 Congress also designed § 85 to give national banks a potential advantage over 
state banks by allowing national banks to charge interest rates higher than state banks 
may charge, provided another lender in the state is permitted to charge that higher rate.  
Tiffany, 85 U.S. at 412-13.  This "most favored lender" doctrine serves the congressional 
purposes of protecting national banks from "the hazard of unfriendly legislation by the 
States" and of promoting the notion that "National banks have been National favorites."  
Id. at 413; see also Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank, 548 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1977) 
(explaining doctrine and exportation principle).  The most favored lender doctrine's 
application to this case allows each defendant to charge a borrower any "interest" charge 
allowed to a lender in the defendant's home state. 
 The exportation principle and the most favored lender doctrine evince strong 
congressional encouragement of national banks' lending efforts and provide powerful tools 
for the national banks to expand their lending activities.  The Supreme Court noted 
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Congress' effort "to insure their taking the place of State banks."  Tiffany, 85 U.S. at 
413.  We now must determine the appropriate definition of "interest" in order to 
effectuate these congressional goals.   
 Associates National Bank assessed Szydlik two late charges and two over-limit 
fees, one of each in January 1991 and one of each in October 1991.  Szydlik alleges that 
neither late fees or over-limit fees are permissible under Pennsylvania law, where he 
resides.  He claims these charges are not within § 85's definition of "interest," and 
therefore federal law (i.e., § 85, with its exportation principal and most favored lender 
doctrine) provides no authorization of the charges.  Szydlik then argues that § 85 does 
not preempt state law with respect to these charges, and that Associates National Bank has 
to defend the state causes of action on the merits.  Associates responds that the charges 
are "interest," that § 85 authorizes the charges as long as any lender in the bank's home 
state can charge them, and that contrary state law must yield under the Supremacy Clause.
 Szydlik asserts that "interest" has at least one of three characteristics: it is 
based on the amount of the unpaid loan balance; it accrues and is measurable over time; or 
the lender requires the charge as consideration for the loan. Interest cannot, Szydlik 
maintains, be a contingent charge, such as "penalty" charges based on the borrower's 
default.0 
 Szydlik would limit the definition of "interest" to charges in the form of 
periodic percentage rates.  Were his definition to prevail, Congress' clear purpose in 
enacting § 85 would be undermined.  As we have explained, "Congress intended to facilitate 
. . . a national banking system."  Marquette, 439 U.S. at 314-15 (quotations omitted).  
Implicit in a national banking system was the possibility that it would "impair the 
                     
0
 Szydlik makes much of the distinction between contingent fees and required fees, 
with only the latter constituting interest.  We decline to recognize the distinction. In 
application, either form of fee can be recharacterized as the other.  For example, Szydlik 
characterizes late fees as contingent penalties for the borrower's failure to pay on time. 
But late fees could equally be characterized as required fees for those borrowers who want 
to extend the term of their loan. 
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ability of States to enact effective usury laws."  Id. at 318.  The most favored lender 
doctrine and the exportation principle apply to all of a national bank's charges for the 
use of its money, and the term "interest" must have a correspondingly broad reach in order 
to assure parity between national banks and other state lenders.  The Supreme Court 
formulated a useful definition in Brown v. Hiatt, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 177, 185 (1873), 
holding that interest is "the compensation . . . for the use or forbearance of money, or
as damages for its detention."  This definition comports with the purposes of § 85.
 A narrower definition would allow states to permit certain favored lenders to 
assess these charges while denying national banks the same privilege.  As Amici for the 
banks argued in their brief, applying Section 85 only to periodic percentage rates "would 
lead to an unworkable and undesirable hodgepodge of fee limits, and periodic rate 
provisions, under the laws of both the bank's state and the borrower's state."  States 
often allow lenders to utilize a variety of credit card charges as an integrated package.  
The Supreme Court noted this point in Marquette, 439 U.S. at 302-03, in which it discussed 
a Nebraska law that set higher percentage rates than did Minnesota law.  The Court 
observed, "To compensate for the reduced [annual rate of] interest, Minnesota law permits 
banks to charge annual fees of up to $15 for the privilege of using a bank credit card."  
Id.  Some states could, for example, decide to limit lenders' use of late fees if those 
lenders are also imposing certain periodic rates. Szydlik's interpretation could therefore 
result in a borrower in one of these states being subject to the periodic percentage rate 
limits but not to the limits on other loan charges as well.  
 Other courts have held § 85 applicable to a broad range of charges.  See, 
Citizens' Nat'l Bank v. Donnell, 195 U.S. 369, 373-74 (1904) (penalty charges for late 
payment); Greenwood Trust, 971 F.2d at 831 (late fees); Fisher, 548 F.2d at 258-61 (cash 
advance fee); Northway Lanes v. Hackley Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 464 F.2d 855, 863 
(6th Cir. 1972) (closing costs); Cronkleton v. Hall, 66 F.2d 384, 385, 387 (8th Cir.) 
(commission paid by lender), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 685 (1933).  The treatment given this 
44 
issue by state tribunals is also persuasive. Both the Supreme Court of California and the 
Supreme Court of Colorado have interpreted § 85 to apply to credit card late charges in 
cases whose facts parallel the consolidated actions before us.  Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), 
N.A., 900 P.2d 690 (Cal. 1995); Copeland v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., No. 94SC409, ___ P.2d 
___, 1995 Colo. LEXIS 743 (Colo. Nov. 20, 1995); but see Hunter v. Greenwood Trust Co.
No. A-103-94, ___ A.2d ___ (N.J. Nov. 28, 1995) (holding that term "interest" in § 85 does 
not include late-payment fees).  These precedents demonstrate the significant weight of 
authority that comports with our interpretation, and they recognize that various loan 
charges often are substantively similar in their economic function to the periodic 
percentage rates casually termed "interest."  
 Likewise, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which has the 
responsibility to oversee "the execution of all laws passed by Congress relating to the 
issue and regulation of a national currency" (including the National Bank Act), 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1 (1988), has interpreted "interest" broadly0 in interpretive rulings and opinion 
letters.0   
                     
0
 We discuss the OCC's interpretation because of its thoughtful analysis, but we 
would reach the same holding without any reliance on the OCC's authority.  Therefore, we 
need not decide how much deference to the OCC's interpretation is warranted under such 
cases as Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 403-04 (1987). 
0
 See, e.g., Letter from Richard V. Fitzgerald, Director, OCC Legal Advisory 
Services Division, to David Rosenberg, Deputy Attorney General, PA (Nov. 24, 1980) 
(stating that "all charges permitted or prohibited by [a national bank's home] state law 
in connection with particular types of loans may be defined as 'interest'" governed by § 
85); Letter from Robert B. Serino, Deputy Chief Counsel (Aug. 11, 1988) (OCC Interpretive 
Letter No. 452), reprinted in [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
85,676 (concerning credit card late charges, returned check charges, and cash advance 
charges); Letter from William P. Bowden, Jr., OCC Chief Counsel, 1992 WL 136390 (OCC) 
(Feb. 4, 1992) (regarding credit card over-limit charges, late charges, and returned check 
charges). 
 
 We note the agencies concerned with enforcement of the other relevant statutes 
have issued similarly broad interpretations.  See, e.g., Letter from Douglas H. Jones, 
FDIC Deputy General Counsel, Opinion No. 92-47 [1992-93 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,534 (July 8, 1992) (regarding § 521 of DIDA); Letter from Harry Quillian, 
Acting General Counsel, FHLBB (June 27, 1986) (regarding § 522 of DIDA). 
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 In a February 17, 1995, letter from the OCC Chief Counsel, the OCC reconfirm
its position regarding many of the types of fees at issue here.  Letter from Julie L. 
Williams, OCC Chief Counsel, to John L. Douglas, Alston & Bird (Feb. 17, 1995). The OCC 
letter discusses annual fees, late charges, and over-limit charges.  Annual fees must fit 
within the definition of interest, the OCC states, because they "compensate the bank for 
other costs and risks associated with establishing and maintaining the account."  Id.
7.  These fees are "akin to commissions [or] closing costs," which are considered within 
the scope of § 85.  Id.  The OCC argues that late charges are likewise a form of interest, 
because they are compensation for the increased lending costs and risks associated with 
borrowers who pay late.  Id. at 9.  In addition, the OCC maintains that over-limit charges 
are compensation for the increased credit risk associated with excess draws upon the 
borrower's credit.  Id. at 11.  This interpretation accords with our view. 
 Congress has written a statute to allow national banks to assess charges 
associated with their loans that comply with the law of the bank's home state, without 
regard to the charges permitted by other states in which the banks may make loans.  The 
definition of interest must be broad to accommodate Congress' effort.0  Indeed, the weight 
                     
0
 The consequences of a broad definition are not uniformly positive.  As the court 
in Tikkanen, 801 F. Supp. at 276, commented: 
 
The consequence of combining a broad definition of interest with the 
exportation principle set forth in Marquette is that national banks 
located in states with liberal credit laws may circumvent consumer 
protection laws enacted in other states.  The exportation principle 
encourages national banks with large consumer credit operations to 
relocate to states with liberal credit laws . . . .  Moreover, . . . 
because section 85 adopts the law of the state in which a national 
bank is located, a given state's consumer protection laws are not 
preempted by a uniform national plan, but by any number of other 
states' laws. 
 
In fact, the converse is equally possible:  A broad definition of "interest" can be 
consistent with the legislative goal of consumer protection.  Lenders frequently seek to 
characterize their charges as other than interest in an effort to circumvent usury laws.  
A narrow definition would permit such practices; a broad definition does not.  Regardless, 
these concerns are properly addressed to Congress, not this court. 
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of authority is overwhelmingly on the side of an expansive definition of interest for 
purposes of §85.  We must next determine whether the specific charges at issue fit within 
this broad definition.   
 We conclude that over-credit limit fees and late fees constitute interest, 
because they provide mechanisms to compensate the lender for the increased lending risk 
associated with people who incur these kinds of charges.  As such, they are compensation 
for the "use or forbearance of money, or . . . damages for its detention."  Brown, 82 U.S. 
at 185.  We hold that the term "interest" in § 85 of the National Bank Act encompasses the 
fees charged by Associates National Bank in this case.  See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), 
N.A., 900 P.2d 690 (Cal. 1995) (reaching same conclusion). 
 Under the most favored lender doctrine, however, Associates National Bank may 
only assess late charges and over-limit fees if they are permitted of a lender in 
California.  We therefore turn to California law. 
 Effective January 1, 1995, California permits credit card issuers to charge a 
graduated late fee of $7 where the minimum payment due is not paid within five days after 
the due date, $10 where the minimum payment due is not paid within 10 days after the due 
date, and $15 dollars where the minimum payment due is not paid within 15 days after the 
due date.  Cal. Fin. Code § 4001(a).  Once the consumer has incurred two late payment fees 
during the preceding year, the monthly late fee can be no greater than $10 where the 
minimum payment is made within five days of the due date.  Id.  The statute also 
authorizes a $10 over-credit fee where the consumer exceeds his allowable balance by the 
lesser of $500 or 120%.  Id. 
 While this statute clarifies the current state of California law, it leaves open 
the validity of pre-1995 late fees and over-credit charges.  This question was not 
adequately briefed in the district court, and we will remand for its consideration.  In 
doing so, the district court should also consider whether § 4001 could be applied 
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retroactively to validate the late fees and over-credit charges to the degree permitted by 
the statute.  Accordingly, we will remand Szydlik for these determinations. 
IV. 
 We shall reverse the decisions of the district courts asserting complete 
preemption jurisdiction in the non-California lender cases, with instructions to remand to 
the state courts. We shall affirm the district court on all other points except its 
dismissal of the claims in Szydlik v. Associates Nat'l Bank, No. 94-3216, regarding late 
charges and over-limit fees charged by Associates National Bank.  We will reverse that 
portion of the district court's dismissal and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
Spellman v. Meridian Bank, Nos. 94-3203/04, 94-3215/16/17/18 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part  
       and concurring in part. 
 
 Under the majority's interpretation that the complete preemption doctrine does 
not provide federal jurisdiction, the courts of each state will decide the extent to which 
national banks are governed by the usury provisions of the National Bank Act.  Because 
Congress passed the National Bank Act in 1864, we must divine congressional intent from a 
distance of more than one hundred years.  Nevertheless the unique history of the National 
Bank Act demonstrates Congress could not have intended the result reached by the majority 
in this case.0  Moreover, the majority's holding creates a conflict with the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which decided in M. Nahas & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank
F.2d 608, 612 (8th Cir. 1991), that the complete preemption doctrine applies to claims 
under section 30 of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 85, 86 (1994).  Because I believe 
Congress intended a uniform federal construction of the Act, and the majority's holding 
                     
0
"Courts, in construing a statute, may with propriety recur to the history of the times 
when it was passed; and this is frequently necessary, in order to ascertain the reason as 
well as the meaning of particular provisions in it."  Leo Sheep Co. v. United States
U.S. 668, 669 (1979) 
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will subject the national banking system to the vagaries of the different states' 
interpretations, I respectfully dissent.  Compare Sherman v. Citibank (S.D.) N.A., No. A
102 (N.J. Nov. 28, 1995) (term "interest" as used in § 85 of the National Bank Act does 
not include late payment fees, and the National Bank Act does not preempt application of 
state law); Mazaika v. Bank One, Columbus, N.A., 653 A.2d 640 (Pa. Super. 1994) (same), 
appeal granted, 659 A.2d 557 (Pa. 1995); with Copeland v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., No. 
94SC409 (Colo. Nov. 20, 1995) (term "interest" as used in § 85 includes late payment fees, 
and National Bank Act preempts application of state law); Smiley v. Citbank (S.D.), N.A.
900 P.2d 690 (Cal. 1995) (same). 
  I. 
 The existence of federal question jurisdiction in this case turns on the 
application of the complete preemption doctrine.  The Supreme Court created this doctrine 
as a corollary to the "well-pleaded complaint" rule to acknowledge that "Congress may so 
completely pre-empt a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group 
of claims is necessarily federal in character."  Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor
U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987).  When the doctrine applies, "any complaint that comes within the 
scope of the federal cause of action necessarily 'arises under' federal law,"  Franchise 
Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 (1983), for purposes of 
removal based on federal question jurisdiction.0   
                     
0The Supreme Court has found complete preemption for claims alleging a breach of a 
collective bargaining agreement that fall under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations 
Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988), see Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 
(1968), and for claims for benefits or enforcement of rights under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988), see Metropolitan Life
481 U.S. at 63-67.  The Supreme Court implicitly found complete preemption in Oneida 
Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 675 (1974), based on the exclusive 
application of federal law to claims regarding tribal rights to Indian lands. Id. at 667; 
see Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 n.8 (1987) (observing the Court's 
implicit use of complete preemption in Oneida). 
 
 The courts of appeals have gradually expanded the reach of the complete 
preemption doctrine.  See, e.g., M. Nahas & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 930 F.2d 608, 612 
(8th Cir. 1991) (holding complete preemption applies to § 85 and § 86 of the National Bank 
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 We have addressed the complete preemption doctrine in several cases and have 
established a two-part test to determine when an area of law is completely preempted.  
First, the federal statute at issue must contain "civil enforcement provisions within the 
scope of which the plaintiff's state claim falls." Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. 
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 858 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Franchise Tax
463 U.S. at 24, 26).  Second, there must be "affirmative evidence of a congressional
intent to permit removal despite the plaintiff's exclusive reliance on state law."  
Allstate Ins. Co. v. 65 Sec. Plan, 879 F.2d 90, 93 (3d Cir. 1989). 
A. 
 As the majority notes, the first prong of the complete preemption test requires 
a comparison between the federal statute's enforcement provisions and the nature of the 
plaintiffs' claims.  We must ask if the National Bank Act's and DIDA's civil enforcement 
provisions, 12 U.S.C. §§ 86 and 1831d, govern the same interests plaintiffs seek to 
vindicate in their suits.  See Allstate Ins., 879 F.2d at 93-94. 
 Section 86 of the National Bank Act, the civil enforcement provision for 
recovery of excessive interest and impermissible loan fees charged by national banks, is 
the exclusive remedy for borrowers to enforce the terms of § 85 of the National Bank Act.
M. Nahas, 930 F.2d at 610; McCollum v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 303 U.S. 245, 248 (1938); 
                                                                                          
Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 85 & 86); Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., 1 F.3d 225, 232-33 (4th Cir. 
1993) (holding complete preemption applies to § 301 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 
301); Trans World Airlines v. Mattox, 897 F.2d 773, 787 (5th Cir.) (holding complete 
preemption applies to § 105(a)(1) of the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1305), 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 926 (1990).  They have also placed limits on its application.  
e.g., Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 963 F.2d 1142, 1144-45 (8th Cir. 1992) (refusing to extend 
the complete preemption doctrine to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide 
Act, 7 U.S.C. §§136-136y); Robinson v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 918 F.2d 579, 585 (6th 
Cir. 1990) (refusing to extend the complete preemption doctrine to suits against trustees 
in bankruptcy); Aaron v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 876 F.2d 1157, 1166 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(refusing to extend the complete preemption doctrine to § 5 of the Longshore and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §905), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1074 (1990). 
0The text of 12 U.S.C. §§ 85-86 is set forth in the majority opinion.  See Majority 
Opinion at 17-18 & n.10. 
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Evans v. National Bank, 251 U.S. 108, 109, 114 (1919); Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. 
Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 34-35 (1875).  Section 85 establishes the rates of interest a 
national bank can charge its customers. 
 Section 521 of DIDA, the civil enforcement provision for individuals charged 
excessive interest by federally insured state banks, is identical to § 86 in all mate
respects.0 Cf. Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 826 & n.7 (1st Cir. 
1992) (noting the identity of language between the first part of § 521 of DIDA and § 85 of 
the National Bank Act), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 974 (1993).  Congress wrote § 521 to have 
the same scope as § 86 and to provide redress for the same type of conduct. 
 The interests the cardholders seek to vindicate are precisely those protected by 
both federal statutes.  Plaintiffs' state law causes of action rest on allegations that 
national banks and federally insured state-chartered banks charged impermissible fees in 
connection with credit card loans. Section 86 of the National Bank Act and § 521 of DIDA 
govern recovery of impermissible loan fees from such banks.  Because the redress sought by 
the plaintiffs falls within the scope of the enforcement provisions of the federal 
statutes, the first prong of the test for complete preemption is satisfied. 
B. 
 Under the second prong of the complete preemption analysis, we must examine 
congressional intent.  Congress has broad authority to control the jurisdiction of the 
lower federal courts.  See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922) 
(observing that, aside from the Supreme Court, "[e]very other court created by the general 
government derives its jurisdiction wholly from the authority of Congress"). Accordingly, 
congressional intent is the "touchstone" for an analysis of the scope of removal 
jurisdiction.  Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987).  The 
                     
0The text of § 521 of DIDA, 12 U.S.C. § 1831d, is set forth in the majority opinion.  
Majority Opinion at 18-19 & n.11. 
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existence of removal jurisdiction in a particular case turns on whether Congress has 
granted it. 
 We have suggested that complete preemption requires "affirmative evidence of a 
congressional intent to permit removal despite the plaintiff's exclusive reliance on state 
law." Allstate Ins., 879 F.2d at 93; see also Goepel v. National Postal Mail Handlers 
Union, 36 F.3d 306, 311 (3d Cir. 1994) (formulating the requirement as one of clear 
congressional intent), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1691 (1995); Krashna v. Oliver Realty, 
Inc., 895 F.2d 111, 114 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); Railway Labor, 858 F.2d at 942 (same).  But 
because the claim of complete preemption in each of our prior cases has foundered on the 
first prong of our test, we have never had occasion to elaborate upon the requirements of 
the second prong.  See Goepel, 36 F.3d at 312-13; Krashna, 895 F.2d at 115; Allstate Ins.
879 F.2d at 94; Railway Labor, 858 F.2d at 942.  Thus, while we have described the second 
prong of the test in dictum, until today we have never issued a holding based upon it.
 At oral argument, defendants suggested that the test for complete preemption 
should focus solely on whether Congress has created an exclusive federal remedy, and that 
our precedent requiring a showing of specific Congressional intent to allow removal should 
be abandoned.  Defendants are correct that the Supreme Court's holdings in Avco Corp. v. 
Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), and Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers 
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983), cannot be explained under our two part test.  Avco 
Corp. focused solely on the preemption of state law by § 301 of the LMRA and concluded on 
that basis that "[r]emoval is but one aspect of the primacy of the federal judiciary in 
deciding questions of federal law."  390 U.S. at 560.  It did not ask whether Congress had 
specifically intended to allow removal of § 301 actions to federal court.  Likewise, in 
Franchise Tax, the Court, without considering the lack of specific congressional intent to 
allow removal, found no complete preemption because § 514(b)(2)(A) of ERISA did not 
provide an exclusive federal remedy.  463 U.S. at 25-26. 
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 The Supreme Court has addressed the scope of the congressional intent 
requirement only in Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 64-66, and there, only in general 
terms.  The courts of appeals have been left to determine the necessary quantum of 
congressional intent.  Not surprisingly, the circuits have taken different approaches.  
Compare Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., 1 F.3d 225, 232-33 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding 
congressional intent to have copyright litigation take place in federal court from grant 
of exclusive jurisdiction); M. Nahas, 930 F.2d at 612 (finding congressional intent for 
complete preemption based on Congress' creation of an exclusive federal remedy in §
the National Bank Act); Trans World Airlines v. Mattox, 897 F.2d 773, 787 (5th Cir.) 
(finding congressional intent to create complete preemption based on Congress' desire to 
maintain uniformity in the law and to "avoid the confusion and burdens that would result 
if interstate and international airlines were required to respond to standards of 
individual states"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 926 (1990); with Hurt v. Dow Chemical Co.
F.2d 1142, 1145 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding no complete preemption where the plaintiff would 
not have had a cause of action under FIFRA, especially when there is no other indication 
of Congress' intent to create complete preemption); Aaron v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.
876 F.2d 1157, 1165-66 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he parties have not pointed to, nor have we 
found, any expression in the statute or the legislative history of congressional intent to 
apply something similar to the Avco exception."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1074 (1990).
                     
0The genesis of our requirement of a showing of specific congressional intent to allow 
removal is Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 67
See Railway Labor, 858 F.2d at 941 (relying on Justice Brennan's concurring opinion).  
While the majority in Metropolitan Life did not examine the quantum of evidence necessary 
to establish congressional intent to give a statute completely preemptive force, Justice 
Brennan wrote separately to emphasize that he would require a clear manifestation of 
congressional intent to allow removal.  Id.  
     I understand the desire to interpret the complete preemption doctrine narrowly in 
order to prevent improvident removals to federal court, but I believe we should examine
congressional intent in a broader fashion, particularly when dealing with statutes enacted 
before the Court's decision in Metropolitan Life.  Our inquiry into congressional intent 
should focus on the importance that Congress ascribed to insuring a uniform interpretation 
of federal law.  Where Congress clearly desired to displace state law by creating an 
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 Of course the clearest case of a satisfactory indication of congressional intent 
is where Congress provides jurisdictional language like that in § 301 of the LMRA.  
Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 65 (finding complete preemption because the jurisdictional 
subsection of ERISA's civil enforcement provision closely parallels § 301's language).
But the Court made clear that ERISA provided unusually clear evidence of congressional 
intent, stating, "[n]o more specific reference to the Avco rule can be expected," id.
66, and "[i]n the absence of explicit direction from Congress, this question would be a 
close one."  Id. at 64.  These statements leave open the possibility that there are 
instances where congressional intent is less clear but nevertheless sufficient to support 
a finding of complete preemption. 
 Congress wrote the National Bank Act in 1864, long before the "well-pleaded 
complaint" rule and the complete preemption doctrine were enunciated.0  We could not 
expect the Congress which enacted the National Bank Act to have discussed the federal 
question jurisdiction or removal implications of §§ 85 and 86, since neither general 
                                                                                          
exclusive federal remedy and stressed the importance of a uniform interpretation of such 
law, I believe we should find complete preemption. 
0In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987), the Supreme Court quoted 
the jurisdictional language in section 502(f) of ERISA: 
 
 The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction, 
without respect to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the 
parties, to grant the relief provided for in subsection (a) of this 
section in any action. 
0Plaintiffs argue the fact that most National Bank Act claims were historically litigated 
in state courts "refutes any finding that Congress clearly intended the type of exclusive 
federal jurisdiction necessary for a finding of complete preemption." Appellants' Consol. 
Br. at 22.  This argument overlooks the essential distinction between exclusive federal 
jurisdiction and an exclusive federal remedy.  Complete preemption does not oust the state 
court of jurisdiction if the defendant is satisfied to stay there.  See Avco Corp. v. Aero 
Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 560 n.2 (1968) (observing state courts may retain 
jurisdiction over cases brought under § 301 of the LMRA).  Indeed, the two statutes which 
form the core of the complete preemption doctrine, the LMRA and ERISA, allow concurrent 
jurisdiction.  Rosciszewski, 1 F.3d at 232.  Both statutes, however, do not allow 
concurrent application of federal and state law. 
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federal question jurisdiction nor general removal power existed in 1864.0  Under these 
circumstances, the majority's requirement of an explicit showing of congressional intent 
to allow removal is too strict.  Instead we should look to less direct evidence of what 
Congress intended regarding the role of federal courts in enforcing the National Bank 
Act.0  See Trans World Airlines v. Mattox, 897 F.2d at 787 (finding complete preemption 
based on Congress' desire to maintain uniformity in the law). 
                     
0Congress granted general original jurisdiction over federal question cases and provided 
for general removal power in 1875. Judiciary Act of 1875, §§ 1, 2, 18 Stat. 470. 
0We discussed one type of indirect evidence of congressional intent in Goepel v. National 
Postal Mail Handlers Union, 36 F.3d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 1994), where we observed that 
"Congress must manifest its intent to authorize the removal of a state claim by enacting a 
federal statute containing an enforcement provision vindicating the same interest as the 
state claim."  Of course, a civil enforcement provision could not by itself constitute 
sufficient evidence of congressional intent because if it did the two-pronged test would 
collapse into one, and in Goepel we specifically re-emphasized the existence of the two
pronged test for complete preemption, id. at 311.  Thus, the quoted passage merely 
suggests that a civil enforcement provision can provide a preliminary indication of 
congressional intent and that the two-prongs of the analysis inform each other even though 
they are distinct inquiries.  I consider it instructive, therefore, that in enacting the 
National Bank Act Congress included civil enforcement provisions which vindicate the 
interests at issue here. 
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1. 
 Accordingly, I believe it is useful to place the current dispute within the 
proper historical context.  Congress passed the National Bank Act of 1863, 12 Stat. 665, 
and replaced it with the National Bank Act of 1864, 13 Stat. 99, in the midst of the 
exigencies imposed by the Civil War.  The statute created the current system of national 
banks and established the limitations on interest charges that we must construe here.
 A thorough understanding of the history of our banking system is incomplete 
without reference to the earlier debates over the First and Second Banks of the United 
States of America. Federalists in the young republic were in favor of a national bank and 
perceived its utility as a source of capital both for the new government and for the 
general economy.  See, e.g., Alexander Hamilton, Treasury Report on a National Bank
13, 1790), reprinted in 1 Documentary History of Banking and Currency in the United States
230, 231-33 (Herman E. Krooss ed., 1969). States' rights advocates and Republicans, 
however, saw the national bank as a threat to liberty and as an aggrandizement of federal 
power beyond the boundaries set by the Constitution. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the 
Constitutionality of a National Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), reprinted in The Portable Thomas 
Jefferson 261, 262 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975). 
 The Federalists, led by Alexander Hamilton, won the opening round of this 
debate, and the First Bank of the United States was given a twenty-year charter beginning 
in 1791.  Bank Act of 1791, § 3, 1 Stat. 191, 192.  The bank was rechartered in 1816 as 
the Second Bank of the United States, again for a twenty-year period.  Bank Act of 1816, § 
7, 3 Stat. 266, 269.  To the extent that the power of Congress to establish the bank had 
been doubted, those doubts were erased in 1819, when the Supreme Court firmly established 
the constitutionality of the national bank in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
316 (1819).  In McCulloch the Supreme Court also enunciated a strong view of the federal 
government, observing that its supremacy over the states is a "great principle" which 
"entirely pervades the constitution."  Id. at 426.   
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 Congress again passed a bill to recharter the bank in July of 1832, but Andrew 
Jackson vetoed it.  John J. Knox, A History of Banking in the United States 69 (Augustus 
M. Kelley pub., 1969) (1903).  His main argument against the bank was that it represented 
an unreasonable expansion of the federal government and monied interests at the expense of 
local interests.  Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to the 
Civil War 405-06 (1957) (hereinafter Banks and Politics).  The charter for the bank 
expired in 1836, and the federal government began to remove its deposits from the banks. 
Knox, supra, at 70-71.   
 After the passage of the Independent Treasury Act of 1846, 9 Stat. 59, the 
federal government kept substantially all of its money in its own vaults.  Bray Hammond, 
Sovereignty and an Empty Purse: Banks and Politics in the Civil War 18-19 (1970) 
(hereinafter Empty Purse).  This system was still in place at the start of the Civil War.  
Id. at 20.  It was a system which "had the . . . effect of stunting federal powers and 
. . . rested on the fallacies that government lay outside the economy, that banking was 
not a monetary function, and that the federal sovereignty had no constitutional 
responsibility for it."  Id. at 22.  
 As secession and the Civil War challenged the national government's survival, 
the inadequacies of the Independent Treasury system were placed in stark relief.  Id.
24.  By 1861, a large number of banks authorized by individual states were issuing bank 
notes for circulation.  Id. at 291.  This state system of issuing banks was barely 
functional, lacking reliability and uniformity.  The Union's military setbacks, combined 
with dire need for more stable financing, led to a movement to establish a uniform 
national currency, which culminated in the passage of the National Bank Act of 1863.  
at 296; The National Bank Act of 1863, 12 Stat. 665.  This act was replaced by the 
National Bank Act of 1864, 13 Stat. 99, but the Act of 1864 left the principal provisions 
of the first law substantially in place. 
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 The National Bank Act thus represents the culmination of the debate regarding 
the proper role of the federal government in the banking system.  It has been suggested 
that the Act created a "revolutionary change . . . in the relative powers of the states 
and the federal government."  Empty Purse, supra, at 333.  This may overstate the case, 
especially in comparison with the impact wrought by the Reconstruction Amendments.  But it 
is clear that the National Bank Act was a significant exercise of congressional authority, 
intended by Congress to alter federal-state relations. 
 The debate on the passage of the Act of 1863 illuminates the views of some 
members of Congress.  Senator Sherman, sponsor of the bill, argued that a motive for it
passage was to "promote a sentiment of nationality."  Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 
843 (1863).  He also suggested the new currency and system for establishing it "if it has 
a fair trial, a fair experiment, will gradually absorb all the State banks, without 
deranging the currency of the country or destroying the value of the property of 
stockholders in banks." Id.   
 The national currency system was designed to cure the worst ills of the state 
banks, but did not eliminate the state banks.  Indeed, at the time, there was considerable 
doubt that Congress had the power to regulate state banks directly, let alone to eliminate 
them.  Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking 
System, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 677, 682 (1988). For example, during a discussion of a proposed 
amendment to the National Bank Act that would have barred state banks from issuing any 
bank note not already in circulation, Senator Sherman asked, "[W]here is the 
constitutional power to do it?"  Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2175 (1864). 
 But it was clear Congress had the authority to charter national banks.  
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).  Even without eliminating state 
banks by statute, Congress thought they would disappear as the state banks exchanged their 
state charters for federal charters.  Congress believed that "a dual banking system would 
exist only during a brief transition period."  Butler & Macey, supra, at 681; see also
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John W. Million, The Debate on the National Bank Act of 1863, 2 J. Pol. Econ. 251, 267 
(1894) ("Nothing can be more obvious from the debates than that the national system was to 
supersede the system of state banks.").  In the debates over the National Bank Act, 
members of Congress frequently expressed their belief that the state banks would 
disappear.  See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2145 (1864) (Senator Sherman 
remarking that the state banks would be absorbed); id. at 1869 (Senator Wilson remarking 
that a dual system of state and national banks should not continue); id. at 1892 (Senator 
Johnson stating that the national banking system was designed to supplant the state 
system). When in fact most state banks did not seek to convert to nationally chartered 
banks, Congress imposed a punitive tax on state bank notes in an effort to ruin the state 
banking system.  Butler & Macey, supra, at 681.  This effort failed, however, as the state 
banks continued to thrive.  Empty Purse, supra, at 297. 
 Against this backdrop, Congress enacted the provision on usury in section 30 of 
the National Bank Act of 1864, 12 U.S.C. §§ 85, 86.  The historical context demonstrates 
that Congress perceived the enactment of the National Bank Act as essential to the 
survival of the republic and believed it equally essential to establish a national banking 
system that was independent of potentially destructive state impulses.  See, e.g., Cong. 
Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1451 (1864) (Representative Hooper, remarking "I believe the 
existence of the nation is at stake upon this issue; that the present necessity requires 
the use of every legitimate means to sustain the credit of the Government . . . .  I 
appeal to the members of the House, and I ask them if they can excuse themselves . . . if 
they sacrifice these great interests . . . to the comparatively petty interests of local 
banking.").  
2. 
 The Supreme Court has described Congress' intent in passing §§ 85 and 86 of the 
National Bank Act.  In Tiffany v. National Bank, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 412-13 (1874), 
the Court observed that Congress passed the interest provisions "to give [national banks] 
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a firm footing in the different States where they might be located."  Id. at 412.  The 
power to impose the same interest charges that state institutions were allowed to impose 
"was considered indispensable to protect [national banks] against possible unfriendly 
State legislation."  Id.  Congress did not intend, the Court continued, "to expose 
[national banks] to the hazard of unfriendly legislation by the States, or to ruinous 
competition with State banks."  Id. at 413.0  The Supreme Court made clear the 
congressional purpose was to enable national banks to resist potential state parochialism. 
 Congressional intent can also be gleaned from the fact that § 86 provides the 
exclusive remedy for usury claims against national banks.0  Evans, 251 U.S. at 109, 114; 
                     
0The Supreme Court has observed that state law continues to play an important role in 
regulating national banks' behavior:  
 
National banks "are subject to the laws of the State, and are governed 
in their daily course of business far more by the laws of the State 
than of the nation.  All their contracts are governed and construed by 
state laws.  Their acquisition and transfer of property, their right 
to collect their debts, and their liability to be sued for debts, are 
all based on state law.  It is only when the state law incapacitates 
the banks from discharging their duties to the government that it 
becomes unconstitutional." 
 
McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1896) (quoting National Bank v. Commonwealth
76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1870)).  The first sentence appears at first glance to provide 
narrow scope for the operation of national banking laws.  But the Court was simply 
observing that state laws in general apply to national banks, just as federal officers are 
"subject to all the laws of the State which affect [their] family or social relations, or 
[their] property, and [they are] liable to punishment for crime . . . ."  National Bank
76 U.S. at 362. The fact that federal law does not replace state contract and property law 
does little to advance our inquiry regarding the preemptive effect of the National Bank 
Act's usury provision.   
 
 Far more important to our inquiry is the broad reading the Supreme Court has 
specifically given to section 30 of the National Bank Act with regard to its preemptive 
effect.  As the Court stated, "In any view that can be taken of the thirtieth section, the 
power to supplement it by State legislation is conferred neither expressly nor by 
implication.  There is nothing which gives support to such a suggestion."  Farmers' & 
Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 35 (1875).  We are concerned here with the 
preemptive effect of the usury provision in the National Bank Act, not with the role state 
law may or may not play in regulating the banks' conduct in other areas. 
0That the federal remedy is exclusive and occupies the field may not provide a direct 
answer to our inquiry.  As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has noted: 
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Dearing, 91 U.S. at 34-35.  Congress intended through the creation of this exclusive 
federal remedy to "prevent the application of overly-punitive state law usury penalties 
against national banks."  M. Nahas, 930 F.2d at 612.  Further, the remedy for usury in § 
86 "preempts the field and leaves no room for varying state penalties."  First Nat'l Bank 
v. Nowlin, 509 F.2d 872, 881 (8th Cir. 1975); see also McCollum, 303 U.S. at 247-48 
(holding the National Bank Act sections completely define the right to recover penalties 
for usurious interest); Barnet v. National Bank, 98 U.S. 555, 558 (1879) (observing the 
federal penalty provisions for usury occupy the field to the exclusion of state usury 
statutes when national banks are involved). 
3. 
 As I have noted, Congress did not seek immediately to eliminate the state 
banking system, but rather believed the state banks would voluntarily seek national 
charters.  See supra part I.B.1.  Members of Congress anticipated state banks would 
disappear as national bank charters became universal.  The Congress that enacted the 
National Bank Act did not expect competition between state and federal law over usury 
claims against national banks because those claims ultimately were to be governed 
exclusively by federal law.  See, e.g., Dearing, 91 U.S. at 35 ("In any view that can be 
                                                                                          
 
[A]sking whether federal law provides a defense or occupies the field 
may just be another way of asking whether the issue of federal 
preemption shall be decided by a state or a federal court, and perhaps 
that question should be asked directly, without taking the essentially 
question-begging step of asking whether the federal statute occupies 
the field.  If the federal statute is deemed merely to create a 
defense, the state court decides whether it is a good defense; if it 
is deemed to occupy the field, the federal court decides whether the 
plaintiff has a cause of action. 
 
Graf v. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co., 790 F.2d 1341, 1345 (7th Cir. 1986).  Despite this 
perceptive observation of the essential nature of the complete preemption inquiry, we 
still must conduct the inquiry following the analysis established by our circuit and the 
Supreme Court's precedent. 
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taken of the thirtieth section, the power to supplement it by State legislation is 
conferred neither expressly nor by implication."). 
 All of this evidence demonstrates that Congress intended to have usury claims 
against national banks governed by a body of federal law which the federal courts would 
apply. Unlike the standard preemption defense case where there is no removal jurisdicti
because the case is really a state case with a federal defense, here we are faced with "a 
federal case in state wrapping paper."  Graf v. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co., 790 F.2d at 1344.
Accordingly, the claims at issue must arise under federal rather than state law, and 
removal is proper. 
 An analysis of § 521 of DIDA leads to the same result. The particular historical 
context I find persuasive for the National Bank Act does not apply to DIDA, which was 
passed in 1980.  But I agree with the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which noted, 
                     
0In Trans World Airlines v. Mattox, 897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1990), the court addressed 
whether § 105 of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 1305 (1988), had 
complete preemptive effect over a state court action for deceptive advertising.  Section 
105 is not a civil enforcement provision, but is an express preemption provision of state 
laws relating to "rates, routes, or services of any air carrier."  49 U.S.C. §1305(a)(1).
 
 The court was persuaded by the legislative history that Congress intended the 
section to have complete preemptive effect. Mattox, 897 F.2d at 787.  The House Report 
stated: 
 
If there was no Federal regulation, the states might begin to regulate 
these areas, and the regulations could vary from state to state.  This 
would be confusing and burdensome to airline passengers, as well as to 
the airlines. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 793, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2857, 
2860.  The court interpreted this and similar passages to indicate Congress' desire "to 
maintain uniformity and to avoid the confusion and burdens that would result if interstate 
and international airlines were required to respond to standards of individual states."  
Mattox, 897 F.2d at 787. 
 
 The analogy to the present case is inexact, but illustrative.  Congress intended 
national banks, like airlines, to be governed by uniform federal law in certain areas.  
One of these areas is usury claims against national banks.  Congress adopted state 
interest limitations in order to place national banks on an even footing with state banks.  
Congress knew this would allow a variety of interest rates to exist but nevertheless 
wanted uniform federal interpretation of usury claims against national banks. 
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"[t]he historical record clearly requires a court to read the parallel provisions of DIDA 
and the Bank Act in pari materia."  Greenwood Trust, 971 F.2d at 827.  Section 521 of DIDA 
was specifically intended to have congruent scope with the National Bank Act with respect 
to the coverage of § 85.  Id.  In order to effectuate this purpose, we must give 
equivalent jurisdictional reach to the two sections and their civil enforcement 
provisions.  Accord Hill v. Chemical Bank, 799 F. Supp. 948, 952 (D. Minn. 1992) (finding 
complete preemption in §521 of DIDA).    
 Removal jurisdiction is generally to be construed narrowly, see La Chemise 
Lacoste v. Alligator Co., 506 F.2d 339, 344 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 937 
(1975), and application of the complete preemption doctrine should be carefully 
circumscribed, Railway Labor, 858 F.2d at 940.  But I am persuaded that complete 
preemption is appropriate because of the unique combination of the statute's history and 
the strong congressional desire for uniform treatment of national banks and of federally 
insured state-chartered banks.  Tiffany, 85 U.S. at 412.  I believe the district court 
properly exercised its removal jurisdiction over these cases.  Accord M. Nahas, 930 F.2d 
at 612; Watson v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 837 F. Supp. 146, 149 (D.S.C. 1993).  But see
Copeland v. MBNA America, N.A., 820 F. Supp. 537, 541 (D. Colo. 1993) (finding no complete 
preemption in §§ 85 and 86 of the National Bank Act); Donald v. Golden 1 Credit Union
F. Supp. 1394, 1403 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (finding no complete preemption in § 523 of DIDA).  
II. 
 I join part III of the majority opinion, but because I do not agree with the 
majority's conclusion in part II that jurisdiction is improper under the complete 
preemption doctrine, I respectfully dissent. 
